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WHY DOESN'T GOD MAKE H IS 
EXISTENCE MORE OBVIOUS? 
. .. 
KEVIN KINGHORN 
In an influential book, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, J. L. Schellenberg 
has argued that God, if he did exist, would surely make his existence and ongoing 
presence in the world more obvious. Schellenberg summarizes his line of argument 
as follows. 
A perfectly loving God would desire a reciprocal personal relationship always 
to obtain between himself and every human being capable of it. But a logically 
necessary condition of such Divine-human reciprocity is human belief in 
Divine existence. Hence a perfectly loving God would have reason to ensure 
that everyone capable of such belief (or at any rate, everyone capable who 
was not disposed to resist it) was in possession of evidence sufficient to bring it 
about that such belief was formed. But the evidence actually available is not of 
this sort . ... The most obvious indication that it is not is that inculpable .. . non-
belief actually occurs. Hence we can argue from the weakness of theistic evi-
dence ... , or more specifically, from the reasonableness of nonbelief, to the 
nonexistence of a perfectly loving God. But God, if he exists, is perfectly lov-
ing. Hence we can argue from the reasonableness of nonbelief to the nonexis-
tence of God. 1 
We can put Schellenberg's line of argument in the following form: 
( I) A perfectly loving God would desire a reciprocal relationship always to 
obtain between himself and every human capable of it. 
(2) But a logically necessary condition of such a relationship is belief in 
God's existence. 
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(3) Hence, a loving Cod would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth 
are in possession of sufficient evidence showing that Cod exists. (From (I) and (2)) 
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort, as evidenced by inculpable nonbelief. 
(5) Hence, a perfectly loving Cod does not exist. (From (3) and (4)) 
In what follows I shall discuss how certain Christian writers have sought to account 
for the fact that Cod remains to some extent 'hidden' from us in this world. I shall 
then outline what I take to be three plausible kinds of responses the Christian theist 
might offer against the kind of objection Schellenberg raises. 
I. DOES INCULPABLE NONBEUEF REALLy O CCUR? 
Some Christian writers have not wanted to concede Schellenberg s working assump-
tion that inculpable nonbelief does in fact occur (premise (4)) . John Calvin, for example, 
seemed to suggest that, whenever a person fails to hold the beliefs requisite for theistic 
faith, he does so as a result of willful spiritual blindness. Calvin maintained that all people 
have at least some beliefs about Cod. He maintained 
that a sense of Deity is indelibly engraven on the human heart. And that this belief 
is naturally engendered in all, and thoroughly fixed as it were in our very 
bones .... mhis is not a doctrine which is first learned at school, but one ... which 
nature herself allows no individual to forget, though many, with all their might, 
strive to do so? 
At the same time, Calvin pointed to human sin in explaining why all people do not hold 
further religious beliefs essential to a proper relationship with Cod, such as the belief that 
we are bound to submit to Cod's authority. He asks, 
how can the idea of Cod enter your mind without instantly giving rise to the 
thought, that since you are his workmanship, you are bound, by the very law of 
creation, to submit to his authorityLthat your life is due to himLthat whatever 
you do ought to have reference to him?3 
Calvin then puts it to his readers that, for those who do not form these further religious 
beliefs, "it undoubtedly follows that your life is sadly corrupted."4 
Calvin is not alone in maintaining that beliefs essential to a relationship with Cod 
would inevitably follow from a life that was free from sin. T ertullian wrote that 
the soul, be it cabined and cribbed by the body, be it confined by evil nurture, be it 
robbed of its strength by lusts and desires, be it enslaved to false gods,- none the 
less, when it recovers its senses, as after surfeit, as after sleep, as after some illness, 
when it recaptures its proper health, the soul names Cod. The witness of the soul 
[is] in its very nature Christian!5 
More recently Mark R. Talbot has argued that, from the Christian perspective, it is entirely 
appropriate to assert the contrary-to-fact conditional: "Everybody would believe in Cod, if 
Why Doesn't Cod Make His Existence More Obvious? 189 
it weren't for sin."6 Talbot goes so far as to claim that "Even unbelievers have some reason 
to think this is true."7 He defends this last claim by pointing to Christians who testify that 
only at their conversions did they recognize that sin had made them resistant to seeing 
certain truths about God. Talbot then contends that even unbelievers can recognize this 
testimony as evidence for the original contrary-to-fact conditional that all people would be 
theists, were it not for sin. 
Is it plausible to suggest that all cases of theistic nonbelief stem from morally culpable, 
self-deceptive acts? Schellenberg certainly thinks otherwise and stresses the importance of 
a subject's conduct "in other epistemic contexts." 
Has he shown himself to be honest, a lover of truth? Does he resist his wants when 
his head tells him he ought not to give in to them ? We may also have reason to 
believe that S desires to have a well-justified belief that C or that not-G. If this is clear-
ly so in some particular case, then (unless there is strong evidence to the contrary) 
we may surely conclude that S is not self-deceived in arriving at [theistic nonbeliefJ.8 
Schellenberg's point here in support of inculpable non belief is that, if a nonbeliever has 
shown himself to be an earnest seeker of truth in non-religious contexts, then we have no 
reason to suppose that he is willfully (and culpably) 'blinding' himself to the truth in reli-
gious contexts. 
In response, the Christian theist might point out that there are different reasons why a 
person might seek to hold true, well-justified beliefs. A person might seek to do so 
because he desires to fulfill his obligations toward his creator and wants to make sure he 
knows of all such obligations he has. If this is the case, then the person can indeed hardly 
be accused of self-deceptive resistance to the truth about God. On the other hand, a per-
son may in some instance seek to hold true, well-justified beliefs simply out of a general 
desire to know lots of facts or because he likes to think of himself as an eminently rational 
person. If this is the case, then it is far from clear that the person who seeks after truth in 
non-religious matters will likely also be open to the truth on religious matters. 
If God does exist and does seek to relate to us as lord, then his commands may fix for 
us any number of obligations- obligations that may reach into such important and person-
al areas as one's finances, vocational choices and sexual behavior. Given that the kind of 
behavioral implications stemming from religious questions seem (at least potentially) far 
greater than with any other question, it seems unclear just how reliable one's attitude 
toward the truth in non-religious contexts will be in predicting one's attitude toward reli-
gious truths. For religious questions have implications for areas of life in which all people 
have heavy personal interest; and the greater one's personal interest in a subject matter, 
the more impetus there is for self-deception. 
Despite this possible response by the Christian theist, Talbot's contrary-to-fact condi-
tional ultimately seems unpromising as a challenge to the kind of objection Schellenberg 
raises. First, even if we suppose that, without sin, all people would form certain general 
beliefs about God- such as the belief 'that God exists' -, it surely remains implausible to 
think that, without sin, all people would form the beliefs requisite for specifically Christian 
faith. A person who has never heard the gospel message about Jesus Christ represents an 
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obvious example where it is more than sin that prevents one from forming Christian 
beliefs. Second, even if we grant that all people's failures to form Christian beliefs do stem 
somehow from sin, the Christian theist will still need to say more if she is to rebut the 
charge that nonbelief undermines God's perfect goodness. Thomas Y. Morris explains. 
Human-defectiveness theories .. . still fall short of what is needed. For any such 
accounts, as typically developed, may explain why we do not see the ordinary 
handiwork of God in creation and in his normal providential governing of the 
world as manifesting him, or why we don't experience his indwelling presence spiri-
tually in any sort of regular or continuous way, but they do not offer any explana-
tion of why God does not do more extraordinary, dramatic miracles to demon-
strate his existence and govemance9 
Thus, even if we grant that some sort of spiritual blindness is affecting the way in which a 
person assesses the evidence available to her, and even if we grant that, without this spiri-
tual blindness, she would form specifically Christian beliefs, we will still want to know 
why God has not provided more positive evidence for her consideration. 
This last point can serve to make Schellenberg's original line of argument even 
stronger. Premise (3) in Schellenberg's original line of argument was this : 
(3) Hence, a loving God would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth 
are in possession of sufficient evidence showing that God exists. (From (I) and (2)) 
However, even if all nonbelievers are "resistant to the truth" about God in that they resist 
the evidence they do have, we can still ask why a perfectly loving God would not do 
more to overcome this resistance by providing more evidence for them to consider. Thus, 
we might change premise (3) of Schellenberg's argument to the even more forceful 
(3)_ Hence, a loving God would bring it about that those not resistant to the truth 
(to the extent that no amount of evidence would leave them unconvincedl are in posses-
sion of sufficient evidence showing that God exists. (From (I) and (2)) 
With this adjusted understanding of Schellenberg's third premise, we are free to remove 
the reference to inculpable nonbelief from his fourth premise. Thus, 
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort, as evidenced by inculpable nonbelief. 
becomes simply: 
(4) Yet the available evidence is not of this sort. 
With this amended line of argument, premise (4)_ remains a challenge to the Christian 
theist even if Calvin and Talbott are correct in maintaining that inculpable nonbelief does 
not exist. For, even if all people are culpable for their failure to believe on the evidence 
Why Doesn't Cod Make His Existence More Obvious 191 
available to them, the Christian theist may still be asked to explain why a loving Cod 
would not provide the kind of evidence that would surely convince even the most resis-
tant toward the truth. 
Would it be possible for Cod to provide evidence of this sort? In David Hume's 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion the character C1eanthes imagines how Cod might 
seek to remove doubts that he exists and has communicated messages to humankind. 
Suppose .. . that an articulate voice were heard in the clouds, much louder and more 
melodious than any which human art could ever reach; suppose that this voice were 
extended in the same instant over all nations and spoke to each nation in its own 
language and dialect; suppose that the words delivered not only contain a just sense 
and meaning, but convey some instruction altogether worthy of a benevolent Being 
superior to mankind- could you possibly hesitate a moment conceming the cause of 
this voice, and must you not instantly ascribe it to some design or purpose?1O 
C1eanthes goes on to remark that a person who objects to theism may still reject this con-
clusion, reasoning that the 'voice' may well be the product of "some accidental whistling 
of the winds." I I It seems more plausible, though, to suppose that most non-theists would 
form theistic beliefs upon witnessing such a dramatic event. N. R. Hanson, who argued 
against the existence of Cod, reflected on the possibility of a dramatic theophany in 
which a "radiant Zeus-like figure, towering above us like a hundred Everests" exclaims for 
every man, woman, and child to hear: "I have had quite enough of your too-clever logic-
chopping and word-watching in matters of theology. Be assured, N. R. Hanson, that I 
most certainly exist." Hanson continued, 
Please do not dismiss this example as a playful, irreverent Disney-oid contrivance. 
The conceptual point here is that if such a remarkable event were to transpire, I for 
one should certainly be convinced that Cod does exist. 12 
So, if Cod does exist and does seek a personal relationship with all people, then why has 
Cod not provided the kind of evidence that would remove all people's doubts about 
these facts? For surely there are many people like Hanson who are not resistant to the 
truth about Cod to the extent that they would fail to hold theistic beliefs if there were evi-
dence of the sort Hanson describes. Is there some reason why Cod remains (at least to 
some degree) hidden? 
II. HiSTORICAL REsPONSES TO DIVINE HIDDENNESS 
BUTLER 
Joseph Butler, in a sermon aptly titled Upon the Ignorance of Man, remarked that 
humans should not expect to understand the ways of Cod- including Cod's reasons for 
remaining partially hidden. 
And as the works of Cod, and his scheme of govemment, are above our capacities 
thoroughly to comprehend: so there possibly may be reasons which originally make 
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it fit that many things should be concealed from us .... The Almighty may cast 
"clouds and darkness round about him," for reasons and purposes of which we 
have not the least glimpse or conception. I } 
Butler held that some facts about Cod are clearly evidenced, remarking that "it is as cer-
tain that Cod made the world, as it is certain that effects must have a cause."14 But as for 
the specifics of Cod's governance of the world, he maintained that the "wisest and most 
knowing cannot comprehend the works of Cod, the methods and designs of his provi-
dence in the creation and government of the world."'S Drawing from Butler's line of argu-
ment, the Christian theist might be inclined to argue that Cod may well have good rea-
sons for not providing us with greater evidence that he exists and seeks to relate to us 
through the person of Jesus Christ. Yet, given our relative ignorance of the way Cod gov-
erns the world, so this line of argument would go, we should not be surprised that Cod's 
good reasons remain inscrutable to us. 
Implicit in Butler's remarks seems to be the acknowledgment that, from the human 
perspective, divine hidden ness may not appear to be characteristic of a perfect world. 
After all, if Cod does exist, and if the holding of true beliefs about Cod is a good thing, 
then it may seem a natural enough judgment that a world with clear evidence in support 
of these beliefs would be better than a world with religious ambiguity. Butler's response is 
that we are not in a position to make such a judgment. 
It is thought necessary to be thoroughly acquainted with the whole of a scheme . .. in 
order to judge of the goodness or badness of it. . .. From our ignorance of the consti-
tution of things, and the scheme of Providence in the government of the world; from 
the reference the several parts have to each other, and to the whole; and from our 
not being able to see the end and the whole; it follows, that however perfect things 
are, they must even necessarily appear to us otherwise, less perfect than they are. 
So, whatever bad effects might be associated with divine hiddenness, it may yet contribute 
toward some greater good. At the same time, given our very limited understanding of the 
ways in which the world is connected and managed by Cod, we should not expect to 
understand what these further good things are and why divine hidden ness makes them 
possible. In short, Butler's main assertion is that we are in a poor epistemic position to ascer-
tain what good reasons Cod might have for remaining (to some extent) hidden from US. 16 
In response to the contention that Cod's good reasons for remaining hidden are 
inscrutable, Schellenberg comments as follows. 
It is to be expected, perhaps, that a Cod would know of kinds of goodness that are 
impossible for us to understand. But why should this lead us to suppose that evils 
like that of the reasonableness of nonbelief. .. in fact serve such goods if Cod exists? '7 
These comments seem telling against the adequacy of any appeal to inscrutability as a 
means of rebutting Schellenberg's original line of argument. Schellenberg's original argu-
ment gives us reason to think that divine hidden ness precludes certain good things-
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specifically the good things associated with a reciprocal relationship with God. [f the 
Christian theist's response is merely that we cannot grasp the ways of God, then the 
Christian theist will have to concede that, as far as we know, it is just as likely that divine 
hiddenness does not serve some further good as it is that divine hidden ness does serve 
some further good. (Additionally, one might press the point that, if we look for some fur-
ther good and do not find one, then we have prima facie reason for thinking that it does 
not exist.> So, on the one hand we have a specific reason- apropos Schellenberg's line of 
argument-to think that God's perfect goodness is undermined by divine hiddenness. On 
the other hand we have the contention-stemming from Butler's comments-that at best 
it is as likely as not that divine hidden ness is linked with some further good. This position 
hardly seems a comfortable one for the Christian theist. 
PASCAL 
Other Christian writers have been more optimistic about the possibility of identifying 
what God's good reasons might be for remaining hidden. Blaise Pascal in his Pensees 
makes repeated references to human pride in addressing the question of why God does 
not do more to remove the religious ambiguity in the world. Pride, of course, plays a cen-
tral role in the Christian tradition's explanation of what keeps humans from the kind of 
personal relationship with God for which they were created. Martin Luther remarked that 
justification before God is only possible when humility overcomes pride. IS And Peter 
Lombard commented that "pride is the root of evil, and the beginning of all sin."'9 The 
aspect of human pride at issue here might be described in general terms as assuming a 
role that belongs only to God. John Wesley defined pride as "idolatry; it is ascribing to 
ourselves what is due to God alone."2o [n the case of Adam's fall, which serves in the 
Christian tradition as a prototype for all human sins, pride is displayed as Adam comes to 
regard his own opinion more highly than God's opinion with respect to where his own 
best interests lie.21 Accordingly, Butler remarked that "Religion consists in submission and 
resignation to the Divine will."22 And Augustine pronounced that 
[sinfull things are done whenever Thou art forsaken, 0 Fountain of Life, who art 
the only and true Creator and Ruler of the universe, and by a self-willed pride any 
one false thing is selected therefrom and loved.23 
Stated roughly, pride is the beginning of all sin because it is pride that leads us to dismiss 
what God has commended in deference to our own planned course of action. 
Pascal identified pride as a fundamental impediment to our relationship with God; and 
he noted that God has taken steps to hold human pride in check. 
God wishes to move the will rather than the mind. Perfect clarity would help the 
mind and harm the will. Humble their pride.24 
At first glance, this passage may appear somewhat enigmatic. However, whatever else 
Pascal might be suggesting here, it seems clear that "perfect clarity" works against certain 
aims God has for humanity. It also seems clear that God's aim of keeping human pride in 
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check is somehow hindered by perfect clarity. Pascal goes on to explain this connection 
between pride and perfect clarity as follows. 
If there were no obscurity man would not feel his corruption: if there were no light 
man could not hope for a cure. Thus it is not only right but useful for us that God 
should be partly concealed and partly revealed, since it is equally dangerous for 
man to know God without knowing his own wretchedness as to know his 
wretchedness without knowing God.25 
As evidence that knowledge about God is harmful to the person who does not have an 
accompanying recognition of her absolute need for God, Pascal points to the "arrogance 
of the philosophers, who have known God but not known their own wretchedness."26 
Pascal's point here seems to be: 'If the evidence for Christian beliefs were overwhelming, 
then people with prideful tendencies would come to form these beliefs. An acquisition of 
said beliefs in such people would actually lead them away from God, for it would bolster 
their confidence in their own mental abilities and thus serve to enhance their prideful 
commitment to self-sufficiency.' 
Of course, Pascal did not suggest that God should provide no evidence in support of 
Christian beliefs. He noted the "equal danger" of one coming "to know his wretchedness 
without knowing God," and as evidence pointed to "the despair of the atheists, who 
know their own wretchedness without knowing their Redeemer."27 Pascal's contention is 
that our religiously ambiguous world leads (or at least, tends to lead)2B to the formation of 
Christian beliefs only in those who would benefit from having these beliefs. 
Thus wishing to appear openly to those who seek him with all their heart and hid-
den from those who shun him with all their heart, he has qualified our knowledge 
of him by giving signs which can be seen by those who seek him and not by those 
who do not. 'There is enough light for those who desire only to see, and enough 
darkness for those of a contrary disposition.'29 
So, God has provided some evidence for Christian beliefs so that those who humbly seek 
him will come to see the truth about him. But God has not provided more evidence than 
he has because greater evidence would tend to lead to theistic beliefs among those in 
whom such beliefs would foster pride. 
In response to Pascal's defense of divine hiddenness, Schellenberg offers several criti-
cisms. First, he wonders whether evidence in the form of religious experiences really is 
likely to foster pride. 
Religious experience has its own distinctive psychological effects, and arrogance is 
not very naturally construed as one of them. Feelings of gratitude, joy, reassurance, 
astonishment, guilt, or dismay seem more likely]O 
In response, though, the Christian theist may suggest that there is in fact some reason to 
think that religious experiences may often lend themselves to pride. Children and adults 
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alike often queue for hours just to glimpse someone famous. An autograph of a sports 
star will often constitute a child's most prized possession and will trump most any other 
child's claim to playground bragging rights. It is rare to find an adult who will not 'drop a 
name' if he has an appropriate name to drop. Indeed, many people's self-described claim 
to fame is simply to have accidentally crossed paths with someone famous. So, it does not 
seem implausible to suggest that one who experiences a direct encounter with the divine 
might well be tempted to take unwarranted pride in her experience. 
Schellenberg offers a further criticism of Pascal that serves as a possible rejoinder to the 
Christian theist's line of response here. 
Part of what God might communicate to us through religious experience is the very 
message of wretchedness and cO/1'Uption that Pascal suggests a Divine disclosure would 
inhibit. Religious experiences, it can be argued, are not all likely to provoke an arro-
gant response, inasmuch as they would awaken in us a sense of our wretchedness 
and corruption (a state incompatible with arrogance) .3 1 
But is it really the case that a recognition through religious experience of one's own cor-
ruption is incompatible with an arrogant response to that recognition? In C. S. Lewis's col-
lection of fictional letters from Screwtape-a 'senior devil' who offers written counsel to 
his apprentice nephew in the art of temptation- we find the following instructions. 
All virtues are less formidable to us once the man is aware that he has them, but 
this is specially true of humility. Catch him at the moment when he is really poor in 
spirit and smuggle into his mind the gratifying reflection, "By jove! I'm being hum-
ble," and almost immediately pride-pride at his own humility- will appear. If he 
awakes to the danger and tries to smother this new form of pride, make him proud 
of his attempt- and so on, through as many stages as you please.32 
When we consider the varied and subtle forms pride might take, it does not seem at all 
clear to what extent (if any) a divine message of one's own corruption would mitigate any 
tendency for that encounter with the divine to become a source of pride in one already 
tending toward prideful attitudes. 
Schellenberg does offer, however, one objection to Pascal's line of argument that 
seems quite forceful. In reference to Pascal's construal of divine hiddenness as a divinely-
given impetus to seek God with humility, Schellenberg remarks, 
All these arguments suggest is that God has a reason for withholding good evidence 
from those humans whose present actions and motives are such as to prevent them 
from responding to it appropriately. No reason is suggested for withholding evi-
dence from those who do not fall into this category-from those, for example, who 
have felt their corruption and the emptiness of life without God and who have 
begun to search for God with proper motives.33 
Are there people who search for God with humility and do not find him? 
Perhaps the proponent of Schellenberg's line of argument will point to the testimonies 
of believers here. The Old Testament records the psalmist David crying out at one point, 
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"0 my God, I cry out by day, but you do not answer, by night, and am not silent."14 In a 
similar vein, we find the prophet Isaiah avowing, 'Truly you are a God who hides himself, 
o God and Savior of Israel."3S St. Augustine is among many professing Christians who 
have wished that God would reveal himself more clearly. 
So speak that I may hear. Behold, Lord, the ears of my heart are before Thee; open 
Thou them, and "say unto my soul, I am thy salvation." When I hear, may I run and 
lay hold on Thee. Hide not Thy face from me. Let me die, lest I die, if only I may 
see Thy face.36 
And St. Anselm offers this poignant lament: 
Never have I seen You, Lord my God, I do not know Your face. What shall he do, 
most high Lord, what shall this exile do, far away from You as he is? What shall 
Your servant do, tormented by love of You and yet cast off 'far from Your face'? .. 
Lord, You are my God and my Lord, and never have I seen You. You have created 
me and re-create me, and you have given me all the good things I possess, and still I 
do not know You. In fine, I was made in order to see You, and I have not yet 
accomplished what I was made for. 37 
Granted, these cries are from believers; and our main concem is with the lack of evidence 
available to eamestly-seeking nonbelievers. Still, these testimonies do seem to illustrate the 
lack of any strict correlation between the extent to which one searches for truths about 
God and the extent to which one finds clear evidence in support of these truths. 
Interestingly, although we have noted Pascal's contention that "there is enough light" 
for those who seek God with proper humility, he seemed at one point in his Pensees to 
acknowledge that some earnestly-seeking people may yet find God hidden to such an 
extent that they fail to hold theistic beliefs. 
Amongst those who are not convinced, I make an absolute distinction between 
those who strive with all their might to learn and those who live without troubling 
themselves or thinking about it. I can feel nothing but compassion for those who 
sincerely lament their doubt, who regard it as the ultimate misfortune, and who, 
sparing no effort to escape from it, make their search their principal and most seri-
ous business.38 
Even if we accept Pascal's earlier contention that God remains hidden so as not to encour-
age undue human pride, is there a reason why a perfectly loving God would remain (to 
some extent) hidden from nonbelievers who do earnestly seek him with humility? 
It might be thought that, even though some nonbelievers may be searching for God 
with humility, God must still maintain religious ambiguity in the world if he is to keep in 
check the pride of certain other nonbelievers who are not humble. Taking up Pascal's line 
of reasoning as to why God remains hidden, Thomas V. Morris writes, 
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Were God to reveal himself to people improperly prepared to come to know and 
love him, such revelation would be more of a curse than a blessing. [n order to 
allow us to develop to the point at which a knowledge of him would be the extra-
ordinarily positive thing it can potentially be, God must govern his public manifesta-
tion in accordance with the needs of the least developed of his human creatures.39 
Morris's point may well hold if we think of public manifestations of the divine as the only 
kind of evidence for Christian beliefs. However, when we consider the possibility of pri-
vate religious experiences, we are still left with the question of why God does not ensure 
that all people who earnestly search for the truth about him come to see their evidence as 
clearly supporting Christian beliefs. 
SWINBURNE 
Richard Swinburne has taken up this question and has argued that God does have 
good reasons for withholding overwhelming evidence of his existence from people-even 
from people who seek him with humility. Swinburne begins with the assumptions that (I ) 
people desire to be liked by others-and would especially desire to be liked by God, if he 
exists; and (2) people have a desire for their own future well-being, which is in God's 
hands if there is indeed a God who allocates a fate to people in an afterlife. It is natural 
for one to believe, Swinburne continues, that, if God does exist, these desires will be real-
ized if one acts well. Given a deep and certain awareness of God's presence, Swinburne 
points out that one would have to have remarkably strong desires to do wrong in order 
for serious moral decisions to be possible. For, a moral decision arises when one's desires 
tempt one to act contrary to what one believes to be morally right. And if the balance of 
one's desires does not seriously tempt one to act contrary to one's moral beliefs- as 
Swinburne imagines that they typically would not, given (a) one's desires to be liked by 
God and to secure future well-being, and (b) one's unwavering belief that by acting well 
God will ensure that these desires are realized-, then one would not face moral decisions. 
In order to provide people with moral choices, Swinburne acknowledges that God 
could have provided overwhelming evidence for theism and also given us a much more 
malicious nature, so that we lacked natural affection for our fellows. Because people 
would then have such a strong desire not to act in accordance with what they believed to 
be morally right, they would still-even with firm and certain theistic beliefs- have the 
opportunity to make moral choices. Alternatively (and preferably), God could have-and 
in fact has- made the evidence of his existence less than compelling. By doing so, he 
makes it possible for us to be "naturally good people who still have a free choice between 
right and wrong."40 For, where there is uncertainty about the existence of God, there is 
uncertainty that one's desires to be liked by God and to secure a favorable afterlife will be 
met by doing what is morally right. Thus, these desires will not incline one so strongly to 
do what is morally right; and one will subsequently not need such strong and malicious 
desires to do wrong in order to be tempted to do so. 
There are various responses to Swinburne's argument one might offer in an attempt to 
show that abundant theistic evidence would not in fact preclude moral choices. First, while 
it is true that people will desire a favorable afterlife if they believe one exists, one might 
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point out that people can be very imprudent, putting off greater future goods for more 
immediate, short-term pleasures. And if short-term pleasures are not enough to tempt an 
unwavering believer to forsake his desire for a favorable afterlife, then he might still be 
tempted to put off performing the right acts he believes will help secure this favorable 
afterlife. Thus, he may decide upon a plan of sowing his wild oats for the time being, with 
the idea of asking for forgiveness and changing his lifestyle sometime later in life before he 
dies. Another source of temptation one might point to for the unwavering believer 
involves self-deceptive techniques to mitigate the badness of his acts. A person may con-
vince himself that his acts are not that bad or that everybody performs bad acts such as 
these. In this way, he may self-deceptively come to believe that the bad acts he desires to 
perform will not significantly undermine Cod's approval or his chances of a favorable 
afterlife. Finally, one might note that certain desires can have considerably more strength 
in a passionate moment than when a person is dispassionately reflecting- in what Butler 
termed 'a cool hour'-on his reasons for acting. A person may unwaveringly believe that 
Cod exists and may in a cool hour consistently have as his strongest desires the desires for 
divine approval and a favorable afterlife-both of which he believes will be afforded to 
him if he acts rightly. The same person may nonetheless succumb to a desire to impress 
his peers during a spirited boy's night out or to sexual urges during a meeting with a 
woman he knows to be romantically off limits. Surely unwavering believers, one might 
argue, can still succumb in the heat of the moment to temptations that they reflectively 
consider to be of much less value than the good goals their heated actions compromise. 
Still, whether or not abundant theistic evidence would always necessitate very strong 
inclinations toward the bad in order for moral choices to present themselves, Swinbume 
has at the very least shown that divine hidden ness represents a way in which Cod might 
provide moral probation and choice for people in this world. Yet, Schellenberg has a gen-
eral objection to the idea that Cod would use the intellectual probation associated with 
divine hiddenness as a means of making moral probation and choice possible. He argues 
that there are other ways in which Cod could make moral probation and choice possible-
ways available within an ongoing relationship with Cod. As an example, Schellenberg 
points to the intellectual challenges afforded by a 'dark night of the soul', where Cod 
intends "the believer to be troubled by questions that shake her confidence and motivate 
her to examine more closely the content of her belief."41 Thus, even if some sort of intel-
lectual probation were necessary for moral probation, this intellectual probation would not 
have to come in the form of Cod remaining hidden to such an extent that eamest seek-
ers could still fail to believe that Cod even exists. 
III. To WHAT ExTENT Is A LACK OF EVIDENCE FOR THEISM A BAD THlNG? 
Schellenberg moves from the superfluity of this kind of intellectual probation to the 
conclusion that a perfectly loving Cod would not use this kind of intellectual probation as 
a means of providing moral probation and choice. His reasons involve the negative effects 
associated with nonbelief. 
now, in the midst of earthly pain and conflict, is when we require Divine guidance, 
support, consolation, and forgiveness .... I suggest that there is indeed reason to sup-
pose that a being who did not seek to relate himself to us explicitly in this life-who 
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elected to remain exclusive, distant, hidden, even in the absence of any culpable 
activity on our part- would not be properly viewed as perfectly loving.42 
But does a lack of theistic belief preclude one from receiving such things as divine guid-
ance and consolation? The recognition that God exists and has issued certain directives is, 
of course, one obvious way in which one might receive guidance from God. But there are 
also less obvious ways in which God might provide guidance- consistent with God 
remaining hidden. It is quite conceivable that God could regulate a nonbeliever's desires 
so that she wants to do what God judges it best for her to do. God could also see to it 
that she simply comes to believe that a certain course of action is best or right or will 
most likely realize the desires she has. 
As far as providing consolation and support, God could well regenerate a nonbeliever's 
emotions so that she came to experience such things as joy, peace, and relief from feel-
ings of guilt. In support of the idea that God does this very thing, perhaps the Christian 
theist would see as evidence the positive feelings that even nonbelievers experience when 
giving to others or the way in which even nonbelievers experience an easing of con-
science when they admit past wrongdoings. It is true that some forms of support and guid-
ance are not available to a nonbeliever. For example, a nonbeliever cannot experience the 
comforting thought that a loving and powerful God is aware of her problems and is 
working to help overcome them in his perfect timing. Still, there seem to be a number of 
ways in which a nonbeliever might yet receive divine support and guidance in the midst 
of earthly pain and conflict. 
Even so, Schellenberg points out that divine guidance and support are not the only 
things of value within a divine-human relationship. 
"God seeks to be personally related to us." In claiming that this proposition is essen-
tial to any adequate explication of "God loves human beings," I am claiming that 
God, if loving, seeks explici~ reciprocal relationship with us, involving not only such 
things as Divine guidance, support, and forgiveness, but also human trust, obedi-
ence, and worship.'3 
The Christian theist will, I think, have to concede that a lack of theistic belief does pre-
clude one from having with God the kind of explicit relationship of which things like wor-
ship are a part. Given that the Christian religion commends above all else a (explicit) per-
sonal relationship with God, one might put to the Christian theist the objection that the 
Christian God, if he really existed, would at aU costs remove obstacles that stood in the 
way of such relationships with himself. 
In responding to this objection, the Christian theist might begin by stressing the point 
that true beliefs about God do not automatically lead a person into an explicit and positive 
personal relationship with God. Rather, true beliefs about God provide the opportunity for 
a person to respond positively to God and thereby (with perhaps other conditions also 
being met) enter into an explicit and positive personal relationship with him . 
Correspondingly, true beliefs about God also provide the opportunity for a person to 
respond negatively to God and thereby move further away from a positive relationship 
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with him. The Gospel of Matthew records Jesus denouncing certain cities that remained 
unrepentant in the face of miracles he performed in them. 
'Woe to you, Korazin' Woe to you, Bethsaida ' If the miracles that were performed 
in you had been performed in T yre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago 
in sackcloth and ashes. But I tell you, it will be more bearable for T yre and Sidon on 
the day of judgment than for you. And you, Capemaum, will you be lifted up to 
the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed 
in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day. But I tell 
you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you." 
One of the ideas here seems to be that, among those people who reject God, those who 
are presented with greater evidence for certain theistic beliefs accrue more moral guilt 
than those who are presented with less evidence. Yes, the opportunity that comes from 
clear theistic evidence and from having true beliefs about God can tum out to be a bless-
ing in that it can move one toward a fulfilling personal relationship with God. But such 
opportunities also can tum out to have the opposite effect. 
IV. DIVINE HIDDENNESS AND THEODICY 
Schellenberg might at this point press the same type of objection he makes against 
Pascal : Why would God not provide clear evidence for theism to those people for whom 
such evidence will serve to move them toward a fulfilling relationship with God? Implicit 
in this question is the suggestion that a perfectly loving God would always provide a per-
son with clear theistic evidence if he knew that the person would respond positively to it. 
We have already noted that the Christian religion affirms that God's chief purpose for us 
is that we take part in a fulfilling and personal relationship with him. So why would God 
not provide a person with clear theistic evidence if he knew that that person would 
respond positively to it and thereby move toward the kind of (explicit) personal relation-
ship with God for which the person was created? 
In offering a theodicy on this point, there seem to be three types of responses that 
the Christian theist might plausibly offer. First, the Christian theist might suggest that 
God does not in fact know for certain just when people will and will not respond posi-
tively to clear theistic evidence. Granted, not all Christian theists would want to take 
such a line. However, there are at present a growing number of Christian writers who 
argue that human decisions cannot be free (on the libertarian definition of freedom) if 
God knows in advance what these decisions will be. Proponents of the so-called 'open 
view' of God suggest that the Christian religion's traditional understanding of God's 
omniscience has long been unduly influenced by Greek philosophical ideas. 
Specifically, they point to the Greek idea that change denotes imperfection. And they 
submit that, in order to resist the notion that change might occur within God as he 
comes to acquire new knowledge by observing what humans freely do, the Christian 
tradition has tended to embrace a much stronger picture of divine immutability than is 
warranted by the Christian scriptures.45 
If God does not know with certainty whether a person will respond positively to fur-
ther theistic evidence at a given point in time, then he will not know with certainty 
Why Doesn't God Make His Existence More Obvious 20 I 
whether the introduction of further evidence at that time will move the person toward or 
away from a positive, personal relationship with himself. It is true that Cod could still 
know whether a person is inclined to respond in a positive way to further evidence. But 
we must also consider that, for one who already has good moral tendencies, a decision to 
break with these tendencies may change significantly the shape of one's moral orienta-
tion. Conversely, a decision to follow the tendencies one already has does not have the 
potential to re-shape one's character to as great an extent. So, the fact that Cod may 
know people's tendencies to respond positively or negatively to a certain piece of theistic 
evidence does not mean that Cod knows whether the introduction of this evidence 
would, all things considered, tend to be a good thing. We conclude, then, that the appeal 
to the incompatibility of (libertarian) free decisions with Cod's advance knowledge of 
those decisions provides one way for the Christian theist to defend Cod's goodness in the 
face of Cod's hiddenness. 
A second type of response the Christian theist might offer draws upon the Christian 
understanding of the universal nature of human sin. Schellenberg's line of argument stipu-
lates that Cod would provide evidence for his existence sufficient for theistic belief to 
those who are "capable" of a relationship with him.46 By 'capable' Schellenberg means 
something like: 'able to enter positively into.' In response to Schellenberg, the Christian 
theist might grant that perhaps many nonbelievers are not so resistant at a time t to the 
truth about Cod that they are incapable of entering into some kind of beneficial relation-
ship with Cod were they to have more evidence for theism. At the same time, the 
Christian theist might insist that the introduction of further evidence at time t may 
nonetheless in many cases make more difficult the kind of deep, long-term personal rela-
tionship with Cod commended by the Christian religion. In other words, the Christian 
theist need not assert that all nonbelievers, if they were to possess clear evidence for 
Cod's existence, would fail to form any relationship with Cod by which they might 
receive certain benefits. Instead, the Christian theist might make the more modest sugges-
tion that all nonbelievers would, upon considering clear evidence, fail to form the kind of 
deep and trusting relationship with Cod that is Cod's ultimate purpose for each person. 
This suggestion is quite natural when we consider the Christian theist's position that all 
humans on earth- believers and nonbelievers alike-have sinful tendencies and thus resist 
the kind of loving and completely self-giving relationship with God for which they were 
created and which the redeemed in heaven enjoy. 
If Cod's ultimate goal in providing theistic evidence is to draw people into this kind of 
deep and self-giving relationship with him, then the Christian theist might suggest that, in 
many cases, clear theistic evidence best draws a person into this kind of deep personal 
relationship only after the person's character becomes developed in certain ways. Thus, 
for the purpose of helping ready people for the kind of deep, personal relationship he 
wishes to have with them, Cod may remove the obstacle of unbelief only after their will-
ful resistance to him has been mitigated by a pattern of good moral choices through 
which they become more capable of such a deep, personal relationship. Put another way, 
moral growth may be best achieved among many people when they first make certain 
moral decisions at earlier stages of their moral development and then at later stages are 
presented with clear theistic evidence. 
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It is not uncommon in human examples for one person to delay making to another 
person an explicit invitation to become involved in a certain kind of loving relationship. 
Even though a positive-albeit more superficial- relationship through which the beloved 
can benefit might be possible early on, a person might still wait until the beloved is judged 
to be in various senses more 'ready' to take part in the deeper relationship the person 
wishes to have with the beloved. In the case of human readiness to commit every aspect 
of life unhesitatingly into the hands of Cod, obstacles to such readiness may take any 
number of forms. We have already discussed how pride can undermine the kind of rela-
tionship with Cod that Cod endeavors to have with people. Other obstacles include a 
fear of commitment, a lack of understanding of the ways in which one needs a savior, 
and the tendency to backslide from an existing relationship where one does not appreci-
ate just how valuable that relationship is. Again, if the Christian theist is correct in affirm-
ing the universal nature of sin, then all people will face such obstacles to the kind of deep 
relationship with Cod for which the Christian religion affirms they were created. 
Schellenberg might at this point want to expand on a previously noted rejoinder of his 
and insist that non-epistemic obstacles to a deep and fully self-giving relationship with 
Cod are best overcome within an existing, explicit relationship with Cod. He appeals at 
one point to the Christian theist's understanding of Cod's "infinite resourcefulness in 
addressing human need" and notes "the testimonials of those who claim that precisely 
through relationship with Cod all manner of ills of the sort that might be introduced 
here- such as initial resistance to Cod or fear of Cod-have been defeated and indeed 
turned into good."47 
But it seems far from clear that an explicit, but less-than-ideal, relationship with Cod 
would always lead one in the direction of the kind of deep, self-giving relationship with 
Cod for which Christians maintain we were created. Suppose that a nonbeliever received 
clear evidence that Cod does exist and has issued the commands contained throughout 
the New Testament. Responding to her new beliefs about what Cod commands of her, 
suppose the person responds positively to Cod's commands on stealing, forgiving, making 
peace and caring for widows and orphans-yet resists Cod's commands regarding lying, 
sexual behavior and finances. Thus, in some respects she becomes more like the kind of 
person who can enter into the deep and trusting relationship with Cod for which the 
Christian religion affirms she was created. On the other hand, she also resists in some 
ways this type of relationship and thereby solidifies her resistance to some aspects of the 
relationship Cod endeavors to have with her. So, has the original introduction of clear evi-
dence led her, all things considered, toward or away from the kind of relationship with 
Cod commended by the Christian religion? This question seems difficult to answer. At 
the very least, it is not obviously correct that resistance to a deep and completely self-giv-
ing relationship with Cod is generally best overcome after epistemic obstacles are first 
removed. And so it remains possible for the Christian theist plausibly to argue that Cod, 
as he works to help us shape our character so that we can participate in the kind of rela-
tionship with him in which we will find ultimate fulfillment, will not see it as necessarily a 
good thing that we enter into an explicit, but less-than-ideal, relationship with him during 
the early stages of our development. 
A third type of response open to the Christian theist is to emphasize that people's rela-
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tionships with Cod are enhanced by the fact that, in a world where Cod's existence and 
character are not obvious to all, people must help one another to leam about God. The 
Christian religion has always emphasized that Cod works through people to spread the 
gospel message. Jesus's reference to how he envisioned the spread of the gospel is record-
ed in the Cos pel of John, where we find Jesus praying "for those [i.e., people throughout 
the world] who will believe in me through their [i.e., his disciples'] message."48 
Accordingly, we find Timothy encouraged by the person who shared the gospel message 
with him to share in tum the gospel message with others. 
What you heard from me, keep as the pattern of sound teaching, with faith and 
love in Christ Jesus .... And the things you have heard me say in the presence of 
many witnesses entrust to reliable men who will also be qualified to teach others.49 
In relying on the testimony of others to learn about the character and promises of Cod-
as well as in tum testifying to others about these things- one learns what it is to be in a 
relationship where one person depends on another for direction in religious matters. That 
is, one learns what it is to be in the kind of dependent relationship into which, according 
to the Christian religion, Cod invites us. And only if Cod remains to some extent hidden 
from us do we have the opportunity to rely on others- and have others rely on us- in 
obtaining spiritual direction in the form of true beliefs about Cod's existence, character, 
promises and directives. 
Continuing this third line of response, the Christian theist can insist that the testimony 
of others does not merely provide a way for people to gain knowledge about Cod. 
Rather, the testimony of others provides an essential way if we are to enjoy fully the rela-
tionships for which we were created. The 'communion of saints' is an important notion in 
the Christian religion, which affirms that humans were created in such a way that their 
relationships with Cod are, in a sense, actualized through their relationships with others. 
While maintaining that humans were created to be in relationship with Cod, the Christian 
theist can also affirm that humans were created such that their proper development and 
well-being require things like physical contact with other people and a sense of belonging 
to a community. As we relate to one another within a community where human touch 
and supporting acceptance are present, we find a kind of fulfillment we would otherwise 
not find. In Cod-centered, loving relationships with one another, the Christian theist may 
emphasize, we experience the love of Cod as we relate to the 'image' of Cod within one 
another. On the understanding that the Holy Spirit infuses those in right relationship with 
Cod with Cod's presence and with Cod-like characteristics such as self-giving love, the 
saints in heaven relate positively to Cod as they relate positively to one another. Thus, it is 
open to the Christian theist to argue that people were created in such a way that they 
find ultimate fulfillment in their relationships with Cod by being in right relationship with 
Cod and with one another. 
The relationships within the community of saints in heaven are meant to reflect the 
loving, self-giving, interdependent relationships within the members of the Trinity. If the 
saints in heaven are not in some ways dependent upon, and responsible for, their fellow 
saints, then their relationships with one another will not be characterized by interdepen-
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dence. Clearly, they could not depend on one another for things only Cod can provide-
such as atonement for sins and sanctifying grace. However, among those spiritually signifi-
cant things the saints can provide for one another are instruction and insights into the 
nature of Cod and his interaction in human history. And clearly, if the saints are to be 
dependent upon, and responsible for, one another with respect to leaming about Cod, 
then Cod will need to limit private revelations and other ways of helping people leam 
about him that do not involve the activity of others. 
While each of the three lines of response we have discussed provides a plausible way 
for the theist to defend Cod's goodness in the face of Schellenberg's general argument 
from divine hiddenness, the third line of response may have the most explanatory poten-
tial. For it involves Cod's general reasons for creating a world that contains a certain 
amount of religious ambiguity. In defending this third line of response, the Christian theist 
can acknowledge that Cod may have reasons for granting special revelations to certain 
people at certain times. For example, the Christian theist may see St. Paul's Damascus 
Road encounter with Jesus Christ as part of Cod's plan to use Paul to preach to the 
Centiles. But while such special, private revelations to certain people may be necessary for 
specific purposes Cod has, the Christian theist can sti ll maintain that it is Cod's general 
intention for people to learn about him with the help of one another. In taking this third 
line of response, then, the Christian theist need not be bothered by the fact that some 
people receive clearer theistic evidence than others. The Christian theist need not point to 
any moral characteristic within unbelievers that accounts for the fact that Cod may have 
made less theistic evidence available for them than for others. Rather, the Christian theist 
can account for divine hiddenness by pointing to Cod's general intention that people 
should learn about him from others. 
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